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Abstract	  In	   his	   Harvard	   Business	   Review	   article	   of	   1972,	   Hugo	   Uyterhoeven	   discussed	   an	  important	   difference	   between	   top	   managers	   and	   middle	   managers.	   While	   both	  categories	   needs	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   directives	   of	   change	   are	   implemented,	   middle	  managers	   have	   a	   two-­‐fold	   task,	   as	   they	   also	   need	   to	   figure	   out	   how	   to	   actually	  implement	  the	  change.	  HBR	  has	  reprinted	  Uyterhoeven’s	  article	  twice	  as	  an	  ’HBR	  classic’.	  Our	  study	  aims	  to	   investigate	  Uyterhoeven’s	  claim	  of	  a	  difference	   in	   logic	  between	  top	  and	   middle	   management	   when	   implementing	   change.	   We	   would	   expect	   such	   a	  difference	   to	   more	   likely	   occur	   when	   performing	   change	   that	   would	   be	   difficult	   to	  implement	   and	   that	   would	   exhaust	   top	   managements	   ability	   to	   control	   the	   details.	  Therefore,	   we	   have	   investigated	   a	   case	   of	   change	   encompassing	   a	   multinational	  company	  and	  that	  would	  require	  organizational	  learning	  about	  its	  own	  processes.	  Our	   findings	   show	   that	   while	   differences	   of	   logic	   occurred	   between	   top	   and	   middle	  management,	   differences	   of	   logic	   also	   occurred	   at	   the	   middle	   management	   level	  between	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  organization.	  These	  differences	  were	  analysed	  according	  to	  the	  dimensions	  of	  organizational	  legitimacy	  and	  organizational	  efficiency.	  We	  discuss	  the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  the	  efficiency	  of	  an	  organizational	  change,	  and	  its	  legitimacy.	  We	  argue	   that	   an	   analysis	   of	   this	   trade-­‐off	   should	  be	   included	   in	   the	   stakeholder	   analysis	  made	  by	  the	  change	  agents.	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Introduction	  A	  firm’s	  ability	  to	  implement	  change	  is	  core	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  survive	  in	  a	  volatile	  market	  and	   to	  outperform	   its	   competitors.	   Central	   to	   this	   ability	   is	   the	   interplay	  between	   top	  and	   middle	   management	   when	   working	   with	   implementing	   the	   strategy	   of	   the	   firm.	  According	  to	  Uyterhoeven’s	  seminal	  Harvard	  Business	  Review	  article	  (Uyterhoven,	  1972,	  1989)	  on	  the	  topic,	  the	  work	  of	  a	  middle	  manager	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  more	  difficult	   in	  comparison	  with	  a	  top	  manager.	  While	  the	  top	  manager	  only	  needs	  to	  manage	  relations	  downwards	   in	   the	   organisational	   hierarchy,	   a	   middle	   manager	   has	   several	   kinds	   of	  relationships	   to	  manage;	   upwards	   (towards	   their	   supervisor),	   downwards	   (with	   their	  subordinates),	   and	   laterally	   (with	   his/her	   peers).	   Perhaps	   the	   major	   reason	   for	   the	  popularity	  of	  Uyterhoeven’s	  text	  among	  the	  readers	  of	  HBR	  is	  that	  it	  focused	  on	  middle	  management’s	   role	   in	   translating	   strategy	   into	   operation.	   It	   identified	   the	   middle	  manager	  as	  the	  hitherto	  unrecognized	  hero	  of	  the	  strategy	  implementation	  of	  the	  firm;	  “the	   buck	   stops	   at	   the	   middle	   manager,	   who	   must	   assume	   the	   bilingual	   role	   of	  translating	  the	  strategic	  language	  of	  his	  or	  her	  superiors	  into	  the	  operational	  language	  of	  subordinates	  in	  order	  to	  get	  results”	  (Uyterhoven,	  1989	  p138).	  The	  text	  thus	  gives	  voice	  to	   the	  work	   situation	   of	  middle	  managers	  when	   performing	   strategy	   implementation,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  role	  to	  whom	  the	  reward	  systems	  of	  many	  firms	  signal	  it	  being	  considered	  less	  difficult	  than	  a	  top	  management	  position.	  Uyterhoeven	   offered	   two	   explanations	   for	   top	   management’s	   push	   of	   the	  implementation	  work	  onto	  middle	  management.	  The	  first	   is	  based	  in	  a	  rational	  system	  perspective	   (Bolman	   &	   Deal,	   1991;	   Scott,	   1998),	   where	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  organizational	  members	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  in	  line	  with	  the	  overall	  interest	  of	  the	  firm;	  as	   the	  middle	  managers	   are	   closest	   to	   the	   action,	   they	  have	  better	   access	   to	   data	   and	  thus	  are	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  make	  the	  detailed	  decisions.	  It	  is	  rational	  to	  organize	  the	  strategy	  work	  in	  such	  order	  that	  top	  management	  defines	  the	  strategy,	  and	  the	  middle	  managers	   translate	   it	   into	   actions.	   This	   rational	   system	   perspective	   of	   the	   interface	  between	  top	  and	  middle	  management	  has	  been	  the	  dominant	  perspective	  in	  much	  of	  the	  performed	  research	  (see	  Wooldridge,	  Schmid,	  &	  Floyd,	  2008	   for	  a	  research	  overview).	  An	  example	  of	   theory	  developed	   in	   this	  perspective	   is	   the	  temporal	   interface	  model	  of	  Raes	   et	   al	   (Raes,	   Heijltjes,	   Glunk,	   &	   Roe,	   2011)	   where	   the	   overall	   organizational	  performance	   depends	   on	   the	   quality	   of	   both	   the	   strategic	   decisions	   and	   its	  corresponding	   implementation,	   and	   where	   mutual	   trust	   between	   top	   and	   middle	  management	  is	  core.	  	  Uyterhoeven’s	  second	  explanation	  is	  based	  in	  a	  political	  system	  perspective	  (Bolman	  &	  Deal,	  1991),	  where	  the	  alignment	  of	  self-­‐interests	  between	  groups	  and	  individuals	  in	  the	  firm	  is	  not	  taken	  for	  granted.	  Using	  this	  perspective,	  Uyterhoeven	  observed	  that	  while	  it	  is	  relatively	  easy	  for	  top	  management	  to	  dictate	  which	  results	  it	  wants	  to	  see,	  it	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	   to	   figure	  out	  novel	  ways	  of	  achieving	  them,	  and	  with	  responsibility	  goes	  risk.	   Thus,	   risk-­‐eliminating	   motives	   influence	   top	   management	   behavior;	   “it	   is	   a	  superior’s	  privilege	  to	  push	  decision	  making	  down	  and	  let	  the	  subordinates	  sweat	  it	  out”	  (Uyterhoven,	  1989	  p138).	  We	  note	  that	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  its	  use	  in	  practice,	  the	  political	  perspective	  of	   the	   firm	   is	   radically	  different	   from	   the	   rational	  one,	   in	   that	   the	   rational	  perspective	   is	   the	   agreed	   one	   between	   all	   organizational	   members,	   while	   political	  behaviour,	   by	   its	   definition,	   simply	   would	   not	   work	   if	   it	   was	   performed	   by	   someone	  being	  open	  about	   it	   (Frost	  &	  Egri,	   1991).	  Alas,	  members	  of	   an	  organization	   rarely	   are	  taught	  how	  organizational	  politics	  is	  being	  played	  by	  somebody	  on	  the	  inside	  of	  it,	  and	  thus	  the	  readers	  of	  HBR	  must	  have	  welcomed	  the	  opportunity	  to	  better	  understand	  the	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motives	   of	   their	   political	   opponents	   (in	   the	   reprint	   of	   1989,	   Uyterhoeven	   noted	   that	  “publication	   of	   this	   article	   led	   to	   many	   invitations	   to	   speak	   to	   corporate	   gatherings”	  p141).	  As	   research	   of	   political	   behaviour	   in	   strategy	   implementation	   has	   pointed	   out,	   also	  middle	  managers	  have	  opportunities	  to	  influence	  the	  strategy	  development	  of	  the	  firm	  (Guth	  &	  MacMillan,	  1986;	  Olin	  &	  Wickenberg,	  2001;	  Sims,	  2003),	  with	  or	  without	  using	  political	  behavior.	  Uyterhoeven	  wrote	  his	  article	  in	  that	  note,	  advising	  middle	  managers	  to	  accept	  when	  the	  actual	  requirements	  of	  their	  work	  differ	  much	  from	  what	  is	  written	  in	  their	  work	  descriptions,	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  actual	  requirements	  of	  their	  positions,	  and	  to	  understand	   that	   the	   drawbacks	   of	   the	  middle	  management	   position	   are	   inherent	   in	   a	  organizational	   structure,	   only	   to	   be	   excluded	   when	   the	   organizational	   structure	   is	  eliminated	  itself.	  Here	  we	  see	  a	  dilemma	  introduced.	  When	  top	  management	  pushes	  the	  risk	  of	  strategy	  implementation	   to	   middle	   management,	   as	   described	   by	   Uyterhoeven,	   it	   replaces	  participative	  leadership	  with	  pace-­‐setting	  leadership	  (Goleman,	  2000),	  expecting	  middle	  management	   to	   achieve	   results.	   In	   their	   strive	   to	   achieve	   and	   report	   expected	   results,	  middle	  management	  would	  then	  be	  subjected	  to	  opportunistic	  motives,	  to	  some	  extent	  distorting	   the	   reporting	   by	   exaggerating	   successes	   and	   covering	   up	   failures	   (Guth	   &	  MacMillan,	  1986).	  This,	  in	  turn,	  would	  negatively	  influence	  top	  management’s	  ability	  to	  monitor	  and	  manage	  the	  change	  required	  in	  the	  firm;	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  learn.	  Thus,	  the	  dilemma	  is	  the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  having	  access	  to	  power	  to	  influence	  the	  organization	  and	  having	  access	  to	  information	  on	  the	  need	  of	  influencing	  the	  organization.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  further	  explore	  this	  dilemma	  and	  the	  way	  it	  affects	  the	  organizational	   learning	  in	  and	  between	  the	  top	  and	  middle	  management	  layers.	  We	  do	  this	   by	   means	   of	   a	   case	   study	   of	   a	   large	   company,	   where	   top	   management	   ordered	  middle	  management	  to	  implement	  Business	  Continuity	  Management	  (BCM)	  processes	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  company’s	  resilience	  to	  failures,	  disasters	  and	  catastrophic	  events.	  
Potential	  disaster	  as	  opportunity	  for	  learning	  and	  risk	  of	  embarrassment	  An	  implementation	  of	  BCM	  in	  a	  firm	  is	  of	  course	  an	  example	  of	  strategy	  implementation,	  but	  there	  is	  another	  reason	  for	  our	  selecting	  a	  case	  of	  BCM	  implementation	  for	  this	  study.	  We	  note	  that,	  after	  BCM	  implementation,	  when	  the	  BCM	  processes	  would	  be	  functional,	  they	  encompass	  activities	  of	  uncertainty	  reduction	  that	  much	  resemble	  the	  uncertainty	  reduction	  required	  by	  middle	  management	  during	  strategy	  implementation.	  A	   commonly	   used	   definition	   of	   BCM	   is	   the	   one	   provided	   by	   the	   Business	   Continuity	  Institute:	   ‘A	   holistic	   management	   process	   that	   identifies	   potential	   threats	   to	   an	  
organization	  and	  the	  impacts	  to	  business	  operations	  that	  those	  threats,	   if	  realized,	  might	  
cause,	   and	   which	   provides	   a	   framework	   for	   building	   organizational	   resilience	   with	   the	  
capability	   for	   an	   effective	   response	   that	   safeguards	   the	   interests	   of	   its	   key	   stakeholders,	  
reputation,	  brand	  and	  value-­‐creating	  activities’	   (Hiles,	  2011,	  p.	  p809).	  This	  process	   is	   a	  variant	  of	  the	  generic	  risk	  management	  process	  commonly	  used	  in	  project	  management;	  first,	  you	  identify	  all	  risks;	  then,	  you	  analyse	  and	  prioritize	  them;	  finally,	  you	  take	  steps	  to	  reduce	   the	  probability	  and	  the	  consequence	  of	  each	  prioritized	  risk	  (Maylor,	  2010).	  Such	  a	  process	  would	   ideally	  prevent	  any	  project	   (in	   the	  case	  of	   risk	  management)	  or	  business	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  BCM)	  from	  experiencing	  failure.	  In	  practice,	  errors	  introduced	  in	  any	  step	  would	  make	  the	  process	  outcome	  deviate	  from	  the	  ideal,	  but	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  this	  study,	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  first	  step,	  risk	  identification.	  
	   4	  
Risk	   identification	   is	   troubled	  by	  a	  philosophical	  problem.	  Since	   the	  set	  of	   risks	   in	   the	  management	   of	   a	   project,	   just	   as	   the	   potential	   threats	   of	   BCM,	   is	   infinite,	   the	   set	   of	  unidentified	  risks	  is	  not	  depletable1.	  Thus,	  there	  must	  be	  other	  reasons	  why	  the	  work	  of	  identifying	   risks	   or	   threats	   finishes.	   Our	   text-­‐book	   review	   revealed	   lots	   of	   advice	   for	  identifying	   risks	   using	   experience,	   creativity	   and	   combinations	   thereof	   (e.g.	  Merritt	   &	  Smith,	   2004).	   How	   to	   define	   criteria	   for	   terminating	   the	   identification	   work	   is	   never	  mentioned,	   neither	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   risk	   identification	   never	   can	   be	   exhaustive.	  Nevertheless,	   risk	   management	   is	   a	   valued	   activity	   in	   project	   management	   (Maylor,	  2010)	  as	  is	  BCM	  in	  general	  management	  (Hiles,	  2011)	  in	  helping	  organizations	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  improve.	  From	   the	   above	   we	   postulate	   the	   following	   regarding	   BCM	   and	   the	   identification	   of	  potential	  threats:	  (1) Top	  management	  directs	  middle	  management	  to	  perform	  BCM;	  (2) The	  better,	  i.e.	  more	  experienced	  and	  more	  creative,	  the	  BCM	  identification	  work,	  the	  better	  the	  resilience	  created;	  (3) Top	  management	  will	  reward	  (or	  punish)	  middle	  management	  for	  the	  perceived	  performance	  of	  their	  BCM	  work	  (4) It	   is	   in	  the	  self-­‐interest	  of	  middle	  management	  to	   influence	  the	  reporting	  to	  top	  management	  regarding	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  BCM	  work	  BCM	  work	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  repeatedly	  for	  different	  areas	  of	  responsibility:	  (5) The	   first	   time	   BCM	   is	   performed,	   it	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   identify	   a	   number	   of	  previously	   unrecognized	   potential	   threats	   (first-­‐time-­‐work	   making	   first-­‐time-­‐finds)	  (6) The	   second	   time	  BCM	   is	  performed	   for	   the	   same	  organizational	  unit,	   it	   has	   the	  potential	  of	   identifying	  a	  potential	  threat	  that	  stayed	  unrecognized	  the	  previous	  time	  (second-­‐time-­‐work	  making	  second-­‐time-­‐finds)	  (7) An	  important	  second-­‐time-­‐find	  will	  be	  positive	  for	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  firm	  and	  positive	   for	  the	   future	  ability	  to	  detect	  such	  threats;	   thus	  the	  second-­‐time-­‐work	  will	  be	  perceived	  as	  good	  BCM	  work	  by	  top	  management.	  (8) However,	  a	  second-­‐time-­‐find	  will	  make	  top	  management	  perceive	  the	  first-­‐time-­‐work	   as	   less	   efficient.	   Thus,	   and	   drawing	   from	   (4),	   the	   responsible	   middle	  manager	  might	  be	  served	  from	  distorting	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  second-­‐time-­‐find	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  top	  management’s	  perception	  of	  the	  first-­‐time-­‐work	  However,	  middle	  management	   responsibility	   for	   organizational	   resilience	   also	   existed	  before	   the	   introduction	   of	   BCM.	   Thus,	   the	   self-­‐interest	   that	   influences	   the	   middle	  manager	  to	  distort	  the	  reporting	  of	  the	  second-­‐time-­‐find	  would	  also	  influence	  him	  or	  her	  during	  the	  reporting	  of	  an	  important	  first-­‐time-­‐find.	  This	  self-­‐interest	  might	  also	  make	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  There	  exist	  exceptions	  to	  this	  claim.	  When	  allowing	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  risk	  to	  expand	  enough	  to	  become	  universal,	  the	  risk	  set	  will	  become	  finite;	  ”Something	  might	  happen”	  (a	   risk	  which	  would	   have	   the	   probability	   of	   1).	   Also,	   using	   risk	   dichotomies	   based	   on	  inversed	   sets	  would	  be	   finite;	   ”A	   technology-­‐related	   issue	  might	   happen”	   and	   ”A	  non-­‐technology-­‐related	  issue	  might	  happen”.	  We	  believe	  the	  use	  of	  such	  definitions	  would	  be	  impractical,	  as	  they	  are	  too	  broad	  for	  the	  design	  of	  mitigation	  activities.	  However,	  they	  might	  be	  useful	  for	  creating	  typologies.	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middle	  manager	   not	   only	   distort	   reporting	   but	   the	   threat	   identification	   of	  BCM	   in	   the	  first	  place.	  To	  continue,	  we	  postulate	  the	  following:	  (9) A	  BCM	  process	  designed	  using	  the	  rational	  system	  perspective	  (Bolman	  &	  Deal,	  1991;	  Scott,	  1998)	  would	  fail	  to	  recognize	  the	  need	  for	  consideration	  of	  the	  self-­‐interests	   at	   play	   in	   the	   organization,	   and	   thus	   would	   be	   resisted	   by	   middle	  management	  (Buchanan	  &	  Badham,	  1999;	  Guth	  &	  MacMillan,	  1986).	  (10) A	  BCM	  process	  designed	  using	  the	  political	  system	  perspective	  (Bolman	  &	  Deal,	  1991)	  would	  consider	  the	  self-­‐interests	  and	  have	  the	  potential	  of	  balancing	  the	  need	  for	  efficiency	  of	  the	  organizational	  learning	  mechanisms	  (Anderson,	  1994;	  Argyris	   &	   Schön,	   1974)	   including	   top	   management	   reporting	   with	   the	  legitimacy-­‐enhancing	  self-­‐interests	  of	  middle	  management.	  (11) A	  development	  of	  such	  a	  politically	  sensitive	  BCM	  process	  would	  be	  difficult	  for	  top	  management	   to	   publicly	   strategize,	   as	   it	   could	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   signal	   of	  acceptance	   of	   political	   behaviour.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   would	   be	   difficult	   for	  middle	  managers	  to	  influence	  the	  design	  of	  an	  overly	  rationalistic	  blueprint	  for	  a	  BCM	  process	  by	  being	  open	  about	  the	  political	  games	  they	  play	  (Buchanan	  &	  Badham,	  2008).	  Thus,	  while	  a	  politically	  sensitive	  BCM	  process	  has	  the	  potential	  of	  being	  advantageous	  to	  a	  rational	  one,	   it	  would	  suffer	   from	  severe	  problems	  regarding	  its	  conception.	  
A	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  case	  and	  the	  method	  used	  CaseCompany	  is	  the	  development	  division	  of	  a	  multinational	  manufacturing	  corporation.	  The	  corporation	  reports	  a	  five-­‐digit	  revenue	  and	  a	  four-­‐digit	  income	  (in	  millions	  of	  EUR),	  and	  a	  five-­‐digit	  staff	  count.	  CaseCompany	  has	  its	  facilities	  dispersed	  on	  a	  small	  number	  of	  locations	  in	  the	  Western	  hemisphere	  and	  employs	  a	  four-­‐digit	  number.	  The	  corporation	  board	  directed	  the	  CEO	  to	  implement	  BCM	  in	  the	  corporation	  by	  advice	  from	   the	   corporate	   accountants.	   The	   CEO	   cascaded	   the	   directive	   to	   the	   divisions	  including	   CaseCompany,	   and	   staff	   at	   CaseCompany	   designed	   a	   set	   of	   templates	   and	  instructions	   for	  how	  to	   further	  cascade	   the	  process	  down	  to	   the	  departmental	   level	  of	  CaseCorp	  (consisting	  of	  hundreds	  of	  departments,	  each	  run	  by	  a	  department	  head),	  how	  to	  perform	  BCM	  on	  the	  department	  level,	  and	  how	  to	  report	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  task.	  When	   the	   BCM	   directive	   was	   received	   by	   the	   department	   head	   of	   one	   of	   the	   IT	  departments,	  Alpha,	  she	  appointed	  a	  person,	  Adam,	  to	  take	  care	  of	  the	  task	  by	  reading	  the	  BCM	  instructions,	  making	  a	  plan	  for	  how	  to	  continue	  the	  work	  and	  then	  report	  back	  to	  her.	  According	  to	  Adam’s	  analysis,	  the	  initial	  BCM	  process	  (hence	  BCM1)	  had	  a	  strong	  focus	  on	   the	   reporting	   of	   the	   progress	   of	   the	   BCM	   work,	   but	   failed	   to	   provide	   sufficient	  guidance	   on	   how	   to	   achieve	   the	   learning	   necessary	   for	   building	   the	   resilience.	   More	  importantly,	   the	   BCM1	   process	   failed	   to	   recognize	   the	   interdependence	   between	   a	  department	  that	   is	  a	  IT	  service	  provider	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  customers	  of	  such	  a	  service	  in	  the	  other	  departments	  of	  the	  different	  sites	  on	  the	  other.	  Adam	  concluded	  in	  his	   reporting	   that	   the	  BCM1	  process	   needed	   improvements	   in	   order	   to	   be	   viable,	   and	  that	  these	  included	  the	  cooperation	  with	  the	  customers	  of	  Alpha.	  The	  department	  head	  of	  Alpha	  supported	  the	  conclusions,	  shared	  them	  with	  the	  fellow	  IT	  department	  heads	  of	  CaseCorp,	  and	  assigned	  a	  small	  budget	  for	  the	  task	  of	  improving	  the	  BCM1	  process.	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Adam	  contracted	  a	  consultant,	  Bill,	   experienced	   in	   industrial	   risk	  management	   to	  help	  with	  the	  work.	  They	  developed	  a	  revised	  BCM	  process	  (hence	  BCM2)	  and	  performed	  a	  number	   of	   pilot	   tests.	   In	   order	   to	   increase	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   group,	   a	   third	  member,	  Charlie	   was	   assigned.	   Adam	   and	   Bill’s	   work	   had	   been	   mainly	   directed	   towards	  implementing	   BCM2	   among	   the	  middle	  manager	   customers	   of	   the	   IT	   departments	   of	  CaseCorp,	  focusing	  on	  its	  efficiency.	  Charlie	  put	  an	  emphasis	  to	  the	  building	  of	  legitimacy	  towards	  top	  management.	  An	  indication	  of	  his	  success	  is	  his	  appointment	  to	  director	  of	  the	  BCM2	  program,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  replacement	  of	  BCM1	  in	  favour	  of	  BCM2	  all	  over	  the	  company.	  As	  of	  today	  Adam,	  Bill,	  and	  Charlie	  have	  all	  left	  CaseCorp.	  Bill	  and	  Charlie	  have	  continued	  to	  work	  with	  business	  continuity	  for	  other	  organizations.	  The	  data	  sources	  for	  this	  study	  are	  the	  documentation	  of	  the	  BCM1	  and	  BCM2	  processes,	  several	  interviews	  with	  Adam	  and	  Bill,	  and	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  book	  describing	  BCM2	  authored	  by	  Charlie.	  The	  data	  from	  the	  interviews	  has	  been	  used	  to	  form	  an	  idiographic	  account	  of	  the	  development	  of	  BCM2.	  	  When	   basing	   research	   on	   a	   single	   case	   study	   like	   this	   one,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   its	  limitations,	  such	  as	  generalizability.	  A	  case	  study	  can	  however	  be	  of	  use	   for	  helping	  to	  formulate	  hypotheses	   for	   further	   investigations	  (Eisenhardt,	  1989),	  and	   it	   is	  with	  such	  intentions	  in	  mind	  which	  we	  report	  on	  this	  study.	  The	  quest	  for	  validity	  should	  include	  an	   effort	   from	   the	   researchers	   to	   investigate	   all	   aspects	   of	   their	   research	   (Alvesson	  &	  Sköldberg,	  2009);	  as	  this	  is	  a	  study	  of	  the	  influences	  of	  self-­‐interests,	  it	  would	  of	  course	  be	   of	   the	   interest	   of	   validity	   to	   reflect	   upon	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   data	   received	   from	   the	  interviewees.	  The	  data	   from	  the	  study	  shows	  that	  at	   least	  one	  of	   the	  sources	  (Charlie)	  was	  successful	  at	  convincing	  top	  management	  at	  CaseCorp	  of	  the	  performance	  of	  BCM2,	  and	  researchers	  would	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  such	  tendencies.	  
Adam	  and	  Bill	  on	  the	  development	  of	  BCM2	  Below	  follows	  the	  account	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  interview.	  Our	  analysis	  is	  interwoven.	  Q:	  What	  was	  the	  problem	  with	  BCM1?	  A:	  Well,	  first	  of	  all	  it	  assumed	  that	  the	  department	  heads	  wanted	  to	  do	  this	  work.	  When	  we	  
started	  discussing	  BCM1	  with	  our	  clients,	  we	  quickly	  learned	  that	  their	  attitude	  was	  ‘if	  it’s	  
an	  IT	  problem,	  we	  hold	  you	  responsible	  for	  solving	  it’.	  We	  don’t	  know	  if	  their	  reaction	  was	  
due	  to	  ignorance	  or	  their	  interest	  to	  save	  time	  by	  making	  us	  do	  the	  work,	  but	  it	  felt	  more	  as	  
if	  they	  feared	  that	  allowing	  us	  to	  discuss	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  certain	  IT	  service	  
with	  them	  would	  make	  us	  reduce	  our	  level	  of	  service.	  Analysis:	  Users	  of	  internal	  services	  has	  found	  that	  social	  pressure	  is	  needed	  to	  help	  service	  functions	  keep	  up	  their	  performance.	  
Another	  problem	  with	  BCM1	  was	  that	  its	  documentation	  was	  written	  in	  a	  style	  that	  was	  
overly	  formal	  and	  very	  pretentious.	  Q:	  Why	  would	  a	  formal	  language	  prevent	  a	  BCM	  from	  coming	  in	  use?	  A:	   BCM1	   assumed	   that	   all	   department	   heads	   would	   be	   able	   to	   figure	   out	   of	   to	   build	  
resilience	  for	  losses	  of	  service,	  not	  only	  in	  IT,	  but	  in	  all	  kinds	  of	  infrastructure	  services,	  such	  
as	   electrical	   power,	   internal	   supplies,	   and	   support	   from	   external	   suppliers	   of	   goods	   and	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services.	   In	   meeting	   with	   the	   department	   heads	   we	   quickly	   realized	   that	   their	   initial	  
reaction	   was	   to	   find	   ways	   of	   not	   having	   to	   invest	   time	   in	   this	   work.	   And	   this	   reaction	  
happened	  despite	  that	  the	  BCM1	  work	  package	  came	  together	  with	  a	  directive	  from	  one	  of	  
our	  vice	  presidents,	  I	  believe	  it	  was	  the	  CFO.	  So	  even	  the	  letter	  from	  the	  CFO	  together	  with	  
the	  authoritative	  language	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  make	  them	  take	  action.	  Analysis:	  includes	  exhibits	  of	  implementation	  resistance	  by	  middle	  management	  (Guth	  &	  MacMillan,	  1986).	  Q:	  So	  what	  did	  you	  do	  to	  make	  it	  happen?	  A:	  We	  thought	  that	  we	  needed	  to	  simplify	  the	  way	  we	  presented	  what	  we	  needed	  them	  to	  
do.	  We	  developed	  a	  simple	  model	  to	  explain	  that,	  for	  instance,	  a	  long-­‐term	  loss	  of	  a	  certain	  
IT	   service	   would	   certainly	   be	   a	   headache	   of	   the	   IT	   department,	   but	   also	   for	   the	   client	  
department,	   who	   would	   need	   to	   manage	   their	   business	   without	   the	   support	   of	   that	  
particular	  IT	  service.	  
We	  also	  abandoned	  the	  pompous	  definition	  of	  BCM	  used	  in	  BCM1.	  Instead,	  we	  defined	  BCM	  
as	   something	   like;	   ‘BCM	   is	   about	   investing	   a	   little	   time	   to	   ask	   ourselves	   “What	   would	  
happen	   of	   this	   particular	   service	   would	   be	   lost?”	   “What	   would	   I	   be	   wishing	   I	   had	   done	  
before,	   that	  would	  have	  helped	  our	  department	  able	   to	  keep	  up	   its	  work	  without	  costing	  
that	   much	   of	   an	   effort	   in	   preparation”’.	   We	   noted	   that	   this	   change	   in	   style	   made	   a	  
difference.	  We	  also	  found	  that	  many	  clients	  were	  relieved	  when	  we	  said	  that	  they	  were	  not	  
required	  to	  cover	  everything,	  just	  the	  most	  important	  things.	  Analysis:	  BCM1	  process	  descriptions	  are	  written	  in	  a	  language	  intended	  to	  increase	  legitimacy,	  but	  it	  reduces	  the	  efficiency.	  Q:	  Were	  you	  authorized	  to	  reduce	  the	  scope	  of	  BCM	  to	  cover	  just	  the	  most	  important	  
things?	  A:	  (Hesitating)	  No,	  but	  we	  didn’t	  regard	  it	  as	  such.	  We	  regarded	  it	  as	  us	  making	  the	  BCM	  
idea	  work	  at	  all.	  And,	  by	  making	  the	  client	  departments	  invest	  a	  little	  time	  to	  reflect	  on	  just	  
a	  few	  crisis	  situations,	  we	  understood	  that	  their	  learning	  from	  these	  situations	  would	  turn	  
into	  a	  much	  improved	  general	  crisis	  management	  ability.	  Analysis:	  here,	   the	   set	  of	  middle	  managers	  changing	  a	  directive	  are	  Adam	  and	  Bill,	  and	  they	  seem	  not	  to	  have	  considered	  not	  being	  authorized	  to	  do	  so.	   They	   seem	   to	   only	   have	   the	   efficiency	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  directive	  in	  focus.	  Q:	  Why	  do	  you	  think	  the	  authors	  of	  BCM1	  did	  not	  recognize	  this?	  A:	  We	  don’t	  know,	  we	  never	  got	  to	  meet	  them.	  But	  BCM1	  was	  written	  in	  a	  style	  that	  made	  
us	  think	  that	  the	  authors	  were	  fans	  of	  the	  audit	  trail-­‐based	  quality	  management	  ideology.	  
‘Prove	  to	  us	  that	  you	  are	  in	  control	  by	  stating	  every	  measure	  that	  you	  have	  done,	  and	  then	  
prepare	  for	  a	  surprise	  audit	  where	  we	  will	  try	  to	  figure	  out	  what	  you	  forgot’.	  Q:	  Why	  would	  not	  that	  work?	  A:	  Well,	  in	  a	  way,	  it	  would	  work,	  but	  not	  produce	  the	  same	  outcome.	  At	  heart,	  BCM	  is	  about	  
making	   people	   learn	   how	   to	   improve	   their	   department’s	   crisis	   management	   ability.	   A	  
report-­‐based	  system	  on	  its	  own	  is	  about	  forcing	  compliance	  without	  offering	  any	  help	  to	  its	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subjects,	   and	   we	   have	   learned	   from	   implementations	   of	   other	   management	   reporting	  
systems	  that	  when	  people	  regard	  reporting	  as	  too	  costly,	  they	  will	  instead	  try	  to	  evade	  that	  
effort.	  The	  original	  scope	  definition	  of	  BCM1	  was	  far	  to	  encompassing	  for	  any	  manager	  to	  
want	  to	  certify	  that	  he	  or	  she	  is	  in	  control	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  crisis.	  And	  that	  was	  what	  BCM1	  
required	  them	  to	  do.	  Analysis:	  a	  reinforcement	  of	  the	  earlier	  exhibit	  of	  implementation	  resistance	  by	  the	  middle	  management	  department	  heads.	  Q:	  Wouldn’t	  the	  authors	  of	  BCM1	  realize	  that?	  A:	   Again,	  we	  never	  met	   them.	  They	  where	  working	  at	   some	  part	   of	  HQ	  were	  we	  had	  no	  
connections	  at	  that	  time.	  Thinking	  of	  it	  now,	  if	  we	  had	  been	  working	  there	  instead	  of	  them,	  
we	  might	  have	  developed	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  solution	  as	  they	  did.	  Working	  there	  would	  mean	  
being	  close	  to	  the	  VIP	  wanting	  the	  issue	  ticked	  off,	  so	  they	  designed	  a	  solution	  that	  focused	  
on	  making	  sure	  that	  reports	  were	  to	  be	  received.	  We,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  worked	  close	  to	  
the	  action,	  so	  we	  focused	  on	  making	  sure	  that	  it	  would	  work.	  Analysis:	  description	  of	  a	  divide	  between	  a	  directing	  and	  controlling	  top	  management	  function	  and	  a	  designing	  and	  implementing	  middle	  management	  function	  (Uyterhoven,	  1972).	  
But	  it	  turned	  out	  that	  the	  pressure	  from	  HQ	  was	  a	  blessing.	  Early	  on,	  we	  learned	  that	  the	  
internal	  audit	   function	  of	  CaseCorp	  had	  been	  ordered	  to	  audit	  the	  performance	  of	  BCM1.	  
So	  we	   contacted	   an	   old	   acquaintance	  we	   had	   there,	   one	   of	   their	   senior	   auditors,	   for	   an	  
informal	   discussion.	   We	   told	   him	   about	   what	   we	   had	   learned	   from	   our	   attempts	   at	  
implementing	  BCM1.	  He	  agreed	  with	  us	  that	  the	  BCM	  scope	  needed	  to	  be	  reduced	  in	  order	  
for	  learning	  to	  occur.	  We	  in	  turn	  told	  him	  that	  it	  was	  paramount	  that	  internal	  audit	  would	  
start	  performing	  BCM	  audits	  after	  a	  certain	  future.	  He	  supported	  this,	  and	  it	  made	  us	  able	  
to	  use	   the	   threat	  of	  a	  possible	   future	  audit	   to	  make	  over-­‐burdened	  department	  heads	   to	  
schedule	  their	  BCM2	  implementation.	  Analysis:	  the	  BCM2	  team	  is	  using	  informal	  channels	  to	  influence	  an	  important	  stake-­‐holder	  function.	  Q:	  Where	  internal	  audit	  in	  on	  this	  good	  cop/bad	  cop	  ploy?	  	  A:	  You	  are	  close,	  this	  was	  actually	  not	  good	  cop/bad	  cop,	  the	  model	  we	  used	  was	  cop/nurse.	  
Both	  are	  legitimate	  roles,	  but	  they	  handle	  information	  very	  differently.	  Police	  are	  required	  
by	  law	  to	  act	  upon	  information	  they	  receive	  and	  report	  it	  to	  the	  legal	  system.	  Nurses,	  on	  the	  
other	   hand,	   are	   required	   by	   law	   to	   never	   convey	   information	   that	   their	   patients	   have	  
trusted	  them	  with.	  We	  signalled	  to	  the	  departments	  we	  helped	  that	  we	  would	  include	  only	  
aggregated	  information	  in	  our	  reports	  of	  the	  performance	  of	  BCM2.	  Analysis:	  BCM2	  is	  designed	  to	  suppress	  details	  of	  information	  that	  would	  embarrass	  the	  department	  heads,	  and	  is	  thus	  a	  politically	  sensitive	  management	  method.	  Q:	  What	  did	  the	  director	  of	  internal	  audit	  have	  to	  say	  about	  this?	  A:	  We	  never	  approached	  their	  director.	  We	  did	  not	  know	  him,	  and	  we	  have	  heard	  that	  he	  
never	  performed	  any	  audits	  of	  his	  own.	  So	  we	  feared	  that	  he	  would	  have	  a	  more	  executive	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style.	  Our	  contact,	  the	  senior	  auditor,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  performing	  audits.	  That	  fact,	  
together	  with	  one	  of	  us	  having	  worked	  together	  a	  number	  of	  years	  earlier,	  made	  us	  believe	  
he	  would	  be	  interested	  in	  helping	  us	  putting	  actual	  BCM	  into	  practice.	  Analysis:	  indicates	  that	  the	  divide	  between	  the	  top	  and	  middle	  management	  logics	  run	  between	  the	  auditor	  and	  their	  director.	  Q:	  Would	  executive-­‐style	  directors	  not	  care	  about	  making	  things	  work?	  A:	  Well,	   of	   course	   they	   do,	   but…	   It’s	   difficult	   to	   approach	   directors	   who	   work	   at	   HQ	   to	  
discuss	  what	  they	  might	  perceive	  as	  details.	  They	  seem	  to	  be	  much	   into	  broad	  principles.	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  implementing	  a	  learning	  system	  such	  as	  a	  BCM,	  the	  devil	  is	  in	  the	  details.	  
And	  he	  might	  not	  have	  enjoyed	   the	  cop/nurse	  analogy.	   It	   indicates	   that	  his	   function	   is	  a	  
little	  hearing	  impaired.	  Analysis:	  indicates	  that	  the	  top	  management	  way	  of	  communication	  is	  unfit	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  design	  details	  of	  politically	  sensitive	  management	  systems.	  Q:	  A	  director	  of	  that	  position	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  such	  matters?	  A:	  Of	  course	  he	  would.	  But	  it	  is	  our	  impression	  that	  directors	  on	  that	  level	  have	  this	  way	  of	  
supressing	  descriptions	  of	  their	  areas	  of	  responsibility	  that	  they	  sense	  are	  unfavourable.	  Q:	   So	  we	   have	   here	   a	   director	   of	   a	   function,	   designed	   to	   transfer	   information	   about	   the	  
performance	   of	   departments,	   to	   top	   management	   that	   would	   supress	   unfavourable	  
information	  about	  his	  department?	  A:	  Yes,	  exactly.	  Again,	  we	  don’t	  know	  the	  behaviour	  of	  this	  particular	  director.	  But	  we	  
would	  be	  surprised	  if	  he	  didn’t.	  People	  at	  his	  level	  always	  seem	  to	  care	  about	  perceptions.	  Analysis:	  reinforcement	  of	  the	  divide	  into	  efficiency	  and	  legitimacy.	  Q:	   You	   said	   earlier	   that	   you,	   when	   you	   performed	   BCM2,	   used	   the	   roles	   of	   nurses,	   not	  
revealing	  details	  of	   information	  that	  would	  embarrass	  the	  department	  heads.	  Would	  you	  
have	  revealed	  information	  to	  important	  stakeholders	  of	  the	  company	  that	  would	  have	  put	  
your	  work	  regarding	  BCM2	  in	  bad	  light?	  A:	  Yes,	  but	  we	  would	  have	  considered	  how	  to	  phrase	  it.	  Stakeholders	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  
the	  organization	  have	  different	  preferences	  on	  how	  to	  be	  informed.	  Analysis:	  consideration	  of	  legitimacy	  is	  necessary	  to	  put	  efficient	  solutions	  into	  practice.	  
Conclusion	  Firstly,	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  article,	  we	  revisited	  Uyterhoeven’s	  text	  on	  the	  divide	  between	  a	  directing	  and	  controlling	  top	  management	  and	  a	  designing	  and	  implementing	  middle	   management.	   The	   results	   from	   our	   study	   give	   support	   to	   the	   claim	   of	   an	  existence	   of	   such	   a	   divide.	   Secondly,	   we	   postulated	   that	   middle	   management	  implementation	  efforts	  in	  areas	  of	  larger	  uncertainty	  would	  create	  resistance	  to	  detailed	  reporting	  among	  middle	  management.	  Our	  results	  support	  also	  this.	  Finally,	   we	   postulated	   that	   a	   politically	   sensitive	   implementation	   would	   improve	   the	  efficiency	   of	   a	   management	   system	   controlling	   an	   area	   of	   high	   uncertainty,	   but	   the	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conception	   of	   such	   a	   system	  would	   neither	   be	   legitimate	   by	   top	  management	   nor	   by	  middle	  management.	  Our	  study	  reports	  of	  a	  case	  where	  top	  management	   introduced	  a	  rational-­‐based	   system,	   which	   was	   legitimate	   but	   had	   low	   efficiency.	   The	   system	   was	  revised	  into	  a	  politically	  sensitive	  system,	  neither	  by	  its	  designers	  and	  nor	  by	  the	  middle	  managers	  subjected	  to	  it,	  but	  by	  another	  set	  of	  designers	  being	  used	  to	  working	  on	  the	  middle	  manager	  level.	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